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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction to review the district cowi's final judgment W1der 
Utah Code§ 78A-3-102(3)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, mandates that public lands 
can only be "disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective purposes 
for which they have been or may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise 
acquired." 
1. Did the district court err by holding that "dispose of' means any 
legislative action that merely orders, regulates, or manages public land? 
Standard of review: The Court reviews for correctness issues of 
constitutional interpretation. Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm 'n, 2011 UT 43, ~ 9, 259 P.3d 1055. 
Issue preservation: This issue was preserved and addressed by the district 
court. See, e.g., Ruling, Order and Final Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff Utah 
Stream Access Coalition (Final Judgment) at 40-43. 
2. Did the district court etT by holding that the Public Waters Access Act 
disposes of the public's easement over public waters contrary to the "purposes for 
which [the easement has] been ... acquired.,? 
1 
Standard of review: The Court reviews for correctness constitutional 
challenges to statutes. In re Baby Girl T, 2012 UT 78, ~ 9, 298 P .3d 1251. 
Issue preservation: This issue was preserved and addressed by the district 
court. See, e.g. , Final Judgment at 45. 
3. Did the district court err in determining that the Public Waters Access 
Act also violated article XX, section 1 because it substantially impaired the lands 
and waters remaining? 
Standard of review: The Court reviews for correctness constitutional 
challenges to statutes. In re Baby Girl T, 2012 UT 78, ~ 9. 
Issue preservation: This issue was preserved and addressed by the district 
court. See, e.g., Final Judgment at 45-59. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be 
granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant 
or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may otherwise be 
acquired, are hereby accepted, and, except as provided in Section 2 of 
this Article, are declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall 
be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be provided 
by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or may 
be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
Utah Const. art. XX, § 1. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: Utah Stream Access Coalition (USAC) challenges the 
Public Waters Access Act's constitutionality. USAC asserts that the Act violates 
various Utah constitutional provisions and the public tmst doctrine. R. 50. 
Course of Proceedings: The patties filed multiple motions for summary 
judgment and the district court ultimately conducted a trial on one issue: whether 
the Act substantially impaired the lands and water remaining. Final Judgment at 2-
8. 
Disposition Below: After a multi-day trial, the district court ruled that the 
Act violated article XX, section 1 because it (1) disposed of the public's easement 
over public waters (2) contrary to the purposes for which the easement was 
acquired, and (3) restricted the public's access to too much of the fishable cold-
water streams and therefore substantially impaired the remaining public waters. 
See generally Final Judgment at 40-59. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Legal background 
More than thirty years ago, this Court recognized that a statute declaring 
public ownership of State waters created a public easement over the waters 
"regardless of who owns the water beds beneath the water." J.J.N.P. Company v. 
State, 655 P. 2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). The Court also noted a "state policy," 
3 
again derived from state statutes, that "recognizes an interest of the public in the 
use of state waters for recreational purposes." !d. Accordingly, the public has a 
right to use State waters for recreational purposes if it can lawfully access the 
waters. Jd. at 1137. 
In 2008, the Court reiterated those principles: (1) by statute, the public owns 
all State waters; (2) this statutory-based public ownership created a public 
easement over those waters; and (3) state policy recognized a public interest in 
using these waters for recreational purposes. Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, ~ 
8, 194 P.3d 897. The Court then announced the public easement's scope as "the 
right to touch privately owned beds of state waters in ways incidental to all 
recreational rights provided for in the easement." /d. ~ 19. As a practical matter, 
Conatser outlined broader easement rights than what the public had generally been 
exercising theretofore: floating on waters flowing over private land to recreate, but 
not stopping on or using the streambed for recreational purposes without approval 
from the property owner. Final Judgment at 19-20. 
The Utah Legislature responded to Conatser by passing the Public Waters 
Access Act in 2010. The Act sets forth the public's rights to recreate on public 
waters. lt reflects the Legislature's careful balance of competing public policies 
and interests at stake given the public's easement on waters running over both 
public and private lands, see, e.g., Utah Const. art. 1, § 1 ("All men have the 
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inherent and inalienable right ... to acquire, possess and protect property."), and 
the State's role as trustee of the public waters on behalf of all people. 
For publicly-owned waters flowing over public land-which constitute the 
vast majority of publicly-owned waters-the Act essentially codified the so-called 
"Conatser easement" allowing the public to use and touch the streambed incidental 
to the recreational easement's use. Utah Code§ 73-29-201. For publicly owned 
waters over privately owned ground, the Act codified the public's pre-Conatser 
customs, allowing floating (and fishing while floating) on public water with the 
right to incidentally touch the streambed as required for safe passage and 
continuous movement. ld. § 73-29-202. The public cannot stop on private 
property or use the streambed incidental to other recreational activities as in 
Conatser. But the Legislature did grant an extended and expanded right of 
portage, including necessary use of the private property. Utah Code§ 73-29-
202(2). 
The Act also created a public recreational access right to use the full 
Conatser easement on waters running over private lands based on continuous 
adverse use for 1 0 years. This right is enforceable by individuals and the Utah 
Division of Wildlife Resources by a quiet title action, if necessary. Utah Code§§ 
73-29-203 and -204. 
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The parties and the lawsuit 
VR Acquisitions, LLC (Victory Ranch), owns land in Wasatch County over 
which an approximately 4-mile stretch of the Provo River flows. R. 2441. 
Members of USAC wanted to fish or otherwise use the Provo River flowing over 
Victory Ranch' s land. R. 54-57. After the Act's passage, disputes allegedly arose 
between USAC members and Victory Ranch about access to the river and 
permitted use ofthe bed. R. 53-57. 
USAC brought this challenge under the Utah Constitution and the public 
trust doctrine. R. 49-50. SAC argued that the Act denied its members the ability 
to fly-fish on or othenvise use stretches of rivers and streams that flow over private 
property and limited their ability to engage in fly-fishing in waters flowing over 
public lands because of overcrowding.' R. 57-59; Final Judgment at 48-49. 
Court proceedings 
The parties filed several rounds of summary judgment motions. The Court 
made substantial written rulings after each round. See generally Final Judgment at 
2-7. Ultimately, the Court ruled that fact issues concerning whether provisions of 
1 USAC initially named as defendants Victory Ranch's predecessor, landowners in 
Wasatch County, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, the Utah Division of 
Parks and Recreations, and Wasatch County Sheriff Todd Bonner. R. 48. The 
current Defendant VR Acquisitions substituted in as party Defendant after it 
purchased the property. R. 1005. The State of Utah intervened to be heard on the 
challenges to the Act and the two named state agencies and the Wasatch County 
Sheriff were then dismissed as parties. R. 144-46. 
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the Act impaired the public's interests in the lands and waters remaining precluded 
summary judgment and set that issue for trial. !d. at 7-8. The district court 
conducted a multi-day trial in August and September, 2015. R. 2445-2463. The 
Com1 issued its Final Judgment on November 4, 2015. R. 2602. 
The trial com1 analyzed the case under Utah Constitution, article XX, 
section 1 as informed by the court's conception of a state public trust doctrine. 
The court determined that the Act "disposed of'' public trust property, thereby 
subjecting it to article XX, section 1 analysis. Final Judgment at 40-44. Next, the 
court concluded that the Act did not dispose of the public's easement for the 
purposes for which the easement was acquired. !d. at 45. The court then turned to 
whether the Act's disposition substantially impaired the remaining lands and 
waters. The trial court found that USAC had not shown a substantial impairment 
based upon increased crowding on the waters flowing over publically owned land 
as a result of the Act, or any other specific negative impact of the Act on those 
waters. !d. at 48-49. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the scope of the Act's 
restrictions on the Conatser easement (affecting 43 percent2 of the State's fishable 
2 Prior to trial, the parties stipulated to various facts, including estimates of some 
waters covered by the Act. R. 2435-37. The State estimated there were 6,419 miles 
of fishable streams in Utah, approximately 2, 73 8 miles of which flowed over 
privately owned beds, while USAC estimated 6,291 miles of fishable streams, 
approximately 2,770 miles of which traversed privately owned streambeds. !d.; 
see also Final Judgment at 7-12. The court recognized that these approximations 
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streams3) substantially impaired the waters remaining. !d. at 49-59. Therefore, the 
district court declared that specific provisions of the Act violated article XX, § 1 of 
the Utah constitution and enjoined any attempt to enforce them. Id. at 59; R. 4870. 
The district court amended its Final Judgment, R. 4846-55, and entered a 
final, formal Judgment, R. 4869. The State and VR Acquisitions, LLC timely 
appealed. R. 4873-74,5122-23. USAC cross-appealed. R. 5126-27. This Court 
subsequently stayed the district court's decision pending this appeal's resolution. 
R. 5148. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court erroneously held that the Public Waters Access Act 
violates article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
As an initial matter, that constitutional provision doesn't apply here because 
the Act doesn't "dispose of' the public's easement. Black's Law Dictionary, a 
source this Court has repeatedly relied on to interpret the Constitution, has long 
underestimated the amount ofpublically owned streambeds and overestimated 
those privately owned, for various reasons. Final Judgment at 12; R. 2435-36. 
3 
"Fishable streams'' is a term adopted by the State and was defined as those 
portions of streams that had "fisheries" on them. "Fisheries" are defined to mean 
those portions of the streams that are sufficient to sustain significant public fishing 
on that portion of the stream, limited to fish species that most people desire to fish 
for. Final Judgment at 11-12; R. 235-36. The district court's subset of State 
waters thus excluded those portions of rivers and streams that did not contain 
fisheries (approximately 14,000 additional miles of rivers and streams) and also 
excluded "still water," meaning lakes and reservoirs. Final Judgment at 8; R. 
2432. 
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defined "dispose" (or "dispose of) as to alienate, or direct the ownership of, or 
transfer something to another's care or possession. This definition makes 
particular sense in the article XX, section 1 context of land or property. Other 
constitutional provisions and state statutes concerning propetty use dispose and its 
variants in the same way. The district court erred in holding that "dispose of' 
means merely to manage, regulate, or controL 
But even if article XX, section 1 applies, the Act comports with its 
requirements (and the public trust requirement the court grafted into the analysis). 
First, although the district court did not address this issue, the Act disposes of the 
public easement as "provided by law." The Act itself is a law that provides for the 
regulation of the Conatser easement. The Legislature has the constitutional right 
to make laws and has long done so with respect to public waters, water rights, and 
water uses. Managing state waters, as the trustee for all of the people, involves 
important policy choices, and the Legislature may prescribe reasonable conditions. 
This is particularly true here because the Act regulates a public easement that arose 
from state statutes. 
Second, to the extent that the Act "disposes of' the public easement, it does 
so "for the respective purposes for which" the easement was "acquired." The 
district court incolTectly concluded that the easement was acquired for the narrow 
purpose of promoting public access, and that the Act was focused solely on the 
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contrary purpose of restricting public access. But that ignores the public 
easement's full scope and the Legislature's duties in passing laws related to the 
public waters. 
The public easement arose from the public's ownership of state waters. 
Public ownership also means that the State assumes the responsibility to manage 
the waters for the welfare and benefit of all the people of the State. The easement 
and the State's duty as trustee to manage the public's waters on behalf of all people 
are thus integrally related. Consequently, the public easement and the State's 
trustee duties go well beyond mere access and use of the waters. The State must 
balance various policies and the needs and sometimes competing water rights and 
interests of all its citizens. 
Similarly, the Act's purposes go well beyond the need to protect private 
property interests. Again, the State as trustee must act on behalf of, and manage 
the various interest of, all its citizens. These interests include recreation, 
conservation, ecology, private ownership, public welfare, and beneficial use, 
among others. Understanding the true scope of the public easement and the Act 
makes clear that the Act manages the easement consistent with the broad purposes 
for which it was acquired. 
Third, the Act also passes the substantial impairment test the district court 
added to the article XX, section 1 analysis. The district court correctly held that 
10 
USAC failed to prove the Act caused overcrowding on the remaining publicly 
accessible waters. The best evidence showed that the vast majority of fishers still 
enjoyed their experience, and various other factors besides the Act could have 
caused any overcrowding. 
Nonetheless, the district court still found that the Act's alleged scope-
restricting access privately owned stream and rivers beds (approximately 43 
percent of State's fishable streams and rivers}-substantially impaired the 
remaining publicly accessible fishable streams and waters. This is wrong for 
multiple reasons. The scope of the Act doesn't matter for purposes of substantial 
impairment; that focuses on the wrong end of the equation. The question isn't how 
much the Act disposed of (the scope), but whether what remains is substantially 
impaired. The inquiry looks forward, not back. 
Moreover, even if the Act's scope provided a proper analytical framework, 
the court miscalculated the Act's impact. The district court considered only the 
Act's application to fishable streams and rivers over private land as a percentage of 
all fishable streams and rivers. But both the public easement and the Act cover far 
more than just the fishable streams and rivers preferred by USAC. The district 
court's calculation left out another 14,000 miles of rivers and streams-in addition 
to the large amount of still waters, including reservoirs and lakes-upon which and 
around the public recreates. And the district cou1t did not consider, and indeed had 
ll 
virtually no evidence to consider, how the Act affected other recreational pursuits 
aside from angling. 
Finally, the examples the court provided to show how the Act's scope could 
impair the public easement are simply unproven overcrowding allegations. 
Surveys about where anglers prefer to fish, increased numbers of licensed anglers 
per river mile, fly-fishing's popularity, Utah's growing population, and the shorter 
and narrower nature of Utah streams do not prove that the Act has caused any 
actual negative impact on the remaining publicly accessible waters. This is 
especially true in light of the fact that the district court already concluded that 
USAC, using many of these same theodes, had not proven the Act caused 
overcrowding. The district court erred in finding the Act substantially impaired the 
remaining waters. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court presumes that Utah's statutes are constitutional and, wherever 
possible, construes them as complying with the state and federal constitutions. 
Any reasonable doubts about a statute's validity are resolved in favor of 
constitutionality, and a statute may not be declared invalid unless it clearly violates 
a constitutional provision. USAC bears the burden of proving the statutes are 
unconstitutional. See generally State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ~ 7, 245 P.3d 745; 
12 
Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm 'n, 2009 UT 26, ~ 5) 223 P.3d 1 089; In re Estate of 
S. T. T., 2006 UT 46) ~ 26, 144 P.3d 1083. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Incorrectly Held That the Act Violates Article XX, 
Section 1. 
The trial court erroneously concluded that the Act violates a state public 
trust doctrine outlined in article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.4 Final 
Judgment at 59. That provision states: 
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter be 
granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired by gift, grant 
or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may otherwise be 
acquired, are hereby accepted) and, except as provided in Section 2 of 
this Article, are declared to be the public lands of the State; and shall 
be held in trust for the people) to be disposed of as may be provided 
by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or may 
be granted) donated, devised or othetWise acquired. 
Utah Con st., art. XX, § 1. 
The Act does not violate this provision. First, the Act never Hdisposed of' 
any lands) meaning the Act is not subject to scrutiny under article XX, section 1. 
Even if the provision applies, the Act still comports with it because any disposition 
was done as "provided by law" and "for the respective purposes for which [the 
public easement] ha[s] been or may be ... acquired." Final Judgment at 40. 
4 The State ofUtah adopts the arguments presented in Appellant VR Acquisitions 
LLC's opening briefbut will not repeat them here. Utah R. App. P. 24(i). The 
State focuses on the district court's article XX, section 1 holdings. 
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Moreover, even if the district court properly infused the constitutional analysis 
with elements of the public trust doctrine, the Act satisfies that test too because it 
does not "substantially impair the public's interest in the lands and waters 
remaining." Final Judgment at 48. 
A. Article XX, section 1 does not apply because the Act does not 
"dispose of' any public land. 
The district court applied Article XX, section 1 to the Act based on the 
erroneous premise that the Act "disposed of' the public's easement. See, e.g., 
Final Judgment at 41. The court misinterpreted the term "dispose of." 
To interpret the constitution, the Court first looks to the relevant text, 
informed-as needed-by (1) the historical evidence of the state of the law when it 
was drafted, and (2) any of the State's relevant, particular traditions at the time of 
drafting. Am. Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ~~ 10-12, 140 P.3d 
1235; see also Proulx v. Salt Lake City Recorder, 2013 UT 2, ~ 8, 297 P.3d 573 
("In interpreting the state constitution, we look primarily to the language of the 
constitution itself .. .. as it would be understood by persons of ordinary 
intelligence and experience." (intetnal quotation marks omitted)); Grand Cty. v. 
Emery Cty., 2002 UT 57,~ 29, 52 P.3d 1148 (the Court' s "starting point in 
interpreting a constitutional provision is the textual language itself' and the Court 
"need not inquire beyond the plain meaning of the [constitutional provision] unless 
we find it ambiguous." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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And in defining relevant constitutional text, the Com1 has repeatedly turned 
to Black's Law Dictionary. See, e.g., Smith v. U.S., 2015 UT 68, ~ 19,356 P.3d 
1249; Proulx, 2013 UT 2, ,, 8-9; T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 
2011 UT 28,131, 254 P.3d 752; Grand Cty., 2002 UT 57,1 30; Romney v. 
Barlow, 469 P.2d 497, 498 (Utah 1970). 
At the time Utah's constitution, including article XX, section 1, was ratified, 
Black's Law Dictionary defined "dispose" as "[t]o alienate or direct the ownership 
of property, as disposition by will.'' Dispose, Black's Law Dictionary (1st ed. 
1891 ), available at http://blacks.worldfreemansociety.org/1/D/d-0376.jpg. 
Subsequent editions have maintained the same (or a virtually identical) definition. 
See, e.g., Dispose, Black's Law Dictionary (2nd ed. 1910), available at 
http://blacks.worldfreemansociety.org/2/D/d0378.jpg ("To alienate or direct the 
ownership of property, as disposition by will."); Dispose of, Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th ed. 1983) e'[t]o alienate or direct the ownership of property; as 
disposition by will. ... To exercise finally, in any manner, one's power of control 
over; to pass into the control of someone else; to alienate, relinquish, part with, or 
get rid of; to put out of the way; to finish with; to bargain away."); Dispose of, 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (same). And the current version of Black's 
likewise defines "disposition" (including the cognate verb form "dispose") as 
"[t]he act of transferring something to another's care or possession, esp. by deed or 
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will; the relinquishing of property." Disposition, Black 's Law Dictionary (I Oth ed. 
2014).5 
Likewise, in explaining the public trust doctrine in 1892- four years before 
article XX, section 1 was ratified-the United States Supreme Court used 
"disposed of' to mean transferring control over. The High Comt explained that 
"[t]he control of the state for purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to 
such parcels as ... can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining." fllinois Central R.R. Co. v. 
illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892). The Court then reiterated that "[t]he state can 
no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, 
like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the 
use and control of private parties, except ... when parcels can be disposed of 
5 Case law from the founding era also appears to have used "dispose of' in this 
same sense of terminating or finishing with something. See, e.g. , Stand. Steam 
Laundry v. Dole, 58 P. 1109, 11 10 (Utah 1899) ("A judgment, to be final, must 
dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of 
the litigation on the merits of the case." (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the 
article XX, section 1 context, the Court has also used "dispose of' the same way. 
Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 199 P. 670,675 (1921) (in context of an 
adverse possession claim for state school lands, the Court stated that article XX, 
section 1 "is an absolute limitation upon the power of the state to dispose of the 
lands, or penn it them to be disposed of, except for the purpose for which they were 
granted by Congress"). 
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without impairment of the public interest in what remains." /d.; see also Br. of 
Aplt. VR Acquisitions LLC at 33-39. 
While admitting that Hdispose of' can mean "'get[ting] rid of" or '"pru1[ing] 
with ... by way of sale or bargain,"' the court opted to use a broader, more general 
dictionary definition: '"to order, control, regulate, manage."' Final Judgment at 
41 (quoting Oxford English Dictionary Online). Under that interpretation, any 
legislative act "ordering, controlling, regulating, or managing public lands" 
necessarily disposes of those lands and triggers article XX, section 1 analysis. !d. 
The court opined that "dispose of' should be given this broader meaning 
based on context and case law. Id. at 41-42. Neither one supports the trial court's 
construction. First, the court reasoned that in context of article XX, section 1, 
which requires public lands to be held in trust for the people, "dispose of' must 
mean any legislative act using, managing or regulating the land (i.e., any 
conceivable legislative action regarding public lands), otherwise pubic trust duties 
would only apply once the "State[] deci[ded) to sell the public lands." Final 
Judgment at 41. But that misreads the relevant text. 
In reality, the provision states that the public lands "acquired" as described 
therein "shall be held in trust for the people to be disposed of as may be provided 
by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or may be ... 
acquired." Properly read, the section mandates that once "acquired," public lands 
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are held in trust for the people. Acquisition triggers that initial trust obligation, not 
disposition. The provision then goes further to require that if these public lands are 
ever "disposed of,"- e.g., sold or otherwise alienated-it must be done as 
"provided by law" and "for the respective purposes for which the( lands] have been 
b . d" or may e ... acqmre . 
Article XX, section 1 's context doesn'tjustify the trial court's decision to 
give "dispose of' such a broad meaning. Rather, the provision's context, dealing 
with public lands (real property) supports the Black's Law Dictionary definition. 
When one speaks about disposing of property or related interests, one typically and 
ordinarily means selling, ceding control, or otherwise transferring some 
meaningful interest, not merely managing or regulating the property. For example, 
the Utah Constitution states "( n ]o municipal corporation, shall directly or 
indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or sources 
of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it." Utah Const., 
art. XT, § 6. Obviously, the provision prohibits only getting rid of the specified 
water rights; it does not prohibit managing or controlling a city's water interests. 
The Federal Constitution grants Congress "the power to dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting a territory or other property belonging to 
the United States .... " U.S. Const., art. IV § 3, cl. 2. If"dispose of' also meant to 
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manage and regulate the land, the additional language authorizing Congress to 
make rules and regulations would be superfluous. 
Fmthetmore, state statutes conceming property commonly use "dispose of' 
or "disposition" to mean sell or otherwise transfer an interest in property. See, e.g., 
Utah Code§ 53C-4-101(1)(a) (within the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Management Act, stating "[t]he director shall establish criteria by rule for the sale, 
exchange, lease, or other disposition or conveyance of trust lands''); Utah Code§ 
53C-4-l 02(2)(a) ("The director shall detetmine whether disposal or retention of all 
or a portion of a property interest in trust lands is in the best interest of the trust."); 
Utah Code§ 57-ll-2(l)(a) (defining "Disposition" in the Utah Unifotm Land 
Sales Practices Act as ~~includ[ing] sale, lease, assignment, award by lottery, or any 
other transaction concerning a subdivision, if undertaken for gain or profit."); Utah 
Code§ 65A-4-1(1)- (2) ("All state agencies may acquire land ... and are 
authorized to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of land no longer needed for public 
purposes .... [And] the proceeds from the sale, lease, or other disposition of land 
shall go to the state agency .... "). 
Second, the district court also erred in claiming Colman v. Utah State Land 
Bd., 795 P.2d 622, (Utah 1990), supports its overbroad "dispose of' interpretation. 
Though recognizing that Colman involved only the public trust doctrine, not article 
XX, section 1, the district court nonetheless found support in the fact that Colman 
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ordered a remand to determine whether leasing part of the Great Salt Lake's bed 
impaired the public's interest. Final Judgment at 42. According to the trial court, 
Colman "demonstrates that the public trust may be violated by a mere lease of 
public land to a private party. A transfer of title or permanent loss of control was 
not required." !d. But that reads too much into the opinion. Neither the patties 
nor the Court raised or specifically addressed whether a lease (or any other 
legislative act) "disposed of' property for public trust purposes. At most, the 
Supreme Court assumed a disposition occurred and remanded the substantial 
impairment question. And even if Colman had held that the lease in question 
"disposed of' a public interest, it still wouldn'tjustify the district court's much 
broader view of the term as mere management or regulation. As Colman itself 
held, the lease at issue conveyed an easement, which is a constitutionally protected 
property interest. 795 P .2d at 625. And even normal leases "for years or from year 
to year" create a protected propetty interest for the lessee. !d. That is a 
significantly different situation than the one presented by the Act, which doesn't 
convey a constitutionally protected property interest to anyone. 
Finally, the district court decided that the Act closed "43% of Utah rivers 
and streams to almost all public recreational use." Final Judgment at 44. "This 
sweeping regulation of the public's easement constitutes a disposition for purposes 
of article XX, section I." !d. The district court offers no support for this 
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proposition, and the State is not aware of any. It is difficult to see how the mere 
quantitative scope of a statute can change it qualitatively from a non-disposal to a 
disposal. 
In sum, the district court erroneously held that to dispose of land under 
article XX, section 1 means to control, regulate, or manage it. In ordinary usage, 
especially in the land context, "dispose of means to sell or otherwise transfer 
material, protected interests. 
B. Even if Article XX, section 1 applies, the Act comports with it. 
Even if the Act "disposed of' a public easement within the meaning of 
article XX, section 1, the Act would not automatically be unconstitutional. Rather, 
article XX, section 1 's plain text establishes that dispositions of public land pass 
constitutional muster if two requirements are met: the dispositions occur (1) "as 
may be provided by law" and (2) "for the respective purposes for which [the public 
lands] have been or may be ... otherwise acquired." Final Judgment at 40; Utah 
Const. art. XX,§ 1. The Act's treatment of public-water easements over private 
lands satisfies both requirements. The Act is thus constitutional. 
1. The Act does not dispose of any public land contrary to law. 
The district court did not address-and therefore did not detetmine-
whether the Act disposed of land "as ... provided by law." But the Act, by 
definition, satisfies this requirement: It is "law" that "provide[s]" for the alleged 
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disposition of an interest in land. And there can be no question that the Legislature 
has the authority to pass laws regulating public waters or the statutorily derived 
public easement. 
The Utah Constitution expressly separates government powers into three 
distinct branches. Utah Const., art. V, § 1. Absent a constitutional proscription, 
"the legislative branch should make the law [and] the judicial branch should be 
confined to interpreting it." Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378, 383 (Utah 1970); 
Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, 57 P. I , 5 (Utah 1899) ("in the absence of any 
constitutional restraint, express or implied, the legislature may act upon any subject 
within the sphere of the government."). 
Accordingly, the Legislature has long governed and regulated water, water 
rights, and the uses of water, dating back to Utah's territorial days. ' 'The right to 
use water in Utah has been governed by statute since 1888." Green River Canal v. 
Thayn, 2003 UT 50,~ 28, 84 P.3d 1134. Even before that, in 1867 the Legislature 
gave the Jordan Irrigation Company rights to construct dams, take waters on both 
sides ofthe Jordan River, and otherwise modify the body of water. 1867 Laws of 
Utah 177. And the Legislature in 1903 declared that "All waters in the state, 
whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be property of the 
public, subject to the existing rights and the use thereof." Utah Code§ 73-1 -1(1) 
(which gave rise to the public easement recognized J.J.N.P. and Conatser). 
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Managing the state's waters "involves questions of policy, and the 
Legislature, in the interest of public welfare, may prescribe reasonable conditions." 
Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957,963 (Utah 1943) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Indeed, "[t]he State, acting as t:mstee rather than owner, has assumed the 
responsibility of allocating the use of the water for the benefit and welfare of all 
the people." Jn re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19,134, 133 P. 3d 410. 
The Legislature has plenary power to establish policy and positive law in the 
State of Utah. This includes regulating the use and appropriation ofthe State's 
waters. The Act resulted from the State's political branches properly exercising 
their constitutional authority to make "law" respecting a specific portion of the 
State's public lands-just as the Utah Constitution and this Court's precedent 
contemplates. 
2. The Act does not dispose of the public easement contrary 
to the respective purposes for which the easement was 
acquired. 
The district court erred in holding that "the Act disposes of the public's 
easement for reasons unrelated to the purpose for which that easement was 
acquired." Final Judgment at 45. According to the court, "the public's easement 
on state waters traversing or impounded upon private property was acquired for the 
purpose of promoting the public access to and use of the waters"; but "[t]he 
Legislature adopted the Act not to promote this purpose but rather to protect 
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against the 'real and substantial invasion of private property rights.'" !d. (quoting 
Utah Code§ 73-29-103(5)). This unduly narrow understanding of the public 
easement and the Act's purposes led the district court to the wrong conclusion. 
A correct view of the public easement starts from the premise that the public 
owns the waters. JJN. P., 65 5 P .2d at 113 6 (citing Utah Code § 73-1-1 ). 
Consequently, "the State must ... assume the responsibility of allocating the use of 
water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a whole." !d. 
The public easement on water flowing over private lands stems from the 
public's ownership of those waters and the State's duty to manage the public 
waters for all. "A coro11ary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the 
rule that there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the 
water beds beneath the water." Jd. That public easement-the public right to be 
on, and use, the water for recreational purposes-is not defeated just because the 
water passes over privately owned land. "Irrespective of the ownership of the bed 
and navigability ofthe water, the public, if it can obtain lawful access to a body of 
water, has the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful 
activity when utilizing that water." ld. at 1137. 
Thus, the pub1ic easement was acquired-if acquired is the right word-not 
just to promote access to use of the waters, but rather as part and parcel of the 
State's right and duty to regulate the use of the water to the benefit and well being 
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of all of the people. And, as this Comt noted in J.J.N.P., it also stemmed from the 
Legislature having made recreational uses a consideration for regulating the State's 
waters. !d. at 1136. 
The State acts as a trustee over all the public's interests and rights in the 
waters in the State ofUtah-including recreational uses, appropriation of waters, 
diversion of waters, and other uses of the waters. To balance those competing 
interests, the State has inherent authority to allocate the "use of the water for the 
benefit and welfare of all the people." In re Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ~ 34 
(emphasis in original). In other words, the State acts as trustee over those waters 
for all the people--recreational users, property owners, and others. And in 
discharging its trustee duties, the Legislature, as the entity charged with adopting 
policies on behalf of the State, balances all of the competing interests and rights 
that are affected by, and that affect, the waters in the State of Utah. Those 
competing interests are not limited to only promoting access to, or use of, the 
water, either as to appropriators, diverters, or recreational users. Rather, the State's 
regulations must take into account the broad range of interests and rights of all 
people. The trial court incorrectly tried to limit the State's purposes and interests 
in regulating the use of the waters, including regulating the use of the public's 
easement, to providing just access. 
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Similarly, the trial court misunderstood the Act's purpose as solely to 
"protect against the real and substantial invasion of private property rights." Final 
Judgment at 45. The court failed to take into account the other purposes set forth 
in the statutes, the case law with regard to the purposes of water regulation and the 
public easement, and the Act 's purposes that the State described at trial. 
In analyzing how the Court should determine the purposes of legislation, this 
Court has stated that the question is not one of specific proof, but rather of 
imputing possible reasonable purposes: 
[l]n ascertaining the underlying legislative purpose, while this court 
should not indulge highly speculative hypotheses as to a statute's 
purpose in applying the presumption of constitutionality, neither are 
we limited to those purposes that can be plainly shown to have been 
held by some or all legislators. We will make our determination on 
the basis of reasonable or actual legislative purposes. Thus, we do 
not require exact proof of the legislative purposes; it is enough if a 
legitimate purpose can be reasonably imputed to the legislative body. 
Utah Safe to Learn, Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State of Utah, 2004 UT 32, 
~ 36, 94 P.3d 217 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Thus, the Court should look to the various sources of legislative purposes, 
including statutory provisions, judicial analysis, and the purposes as proffered by 
the State. 
The trial court found a single, limited purpose based solely on Utah Code 
§ 73-29-103(5), part of the Act's declarations. To be sure, those declarations 
establish at least part of the Act's purpose-they are the Legislature's assessment 
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of policy problems it saw in the Conatser decision. But nowhere does section 73-
29-103(5) purport to establish that specific declaration constitutes the Act's sole 
(or even main) purpose. Other provisions of the Act, plus other statutory 
provisions, show a broader purpose in connection with the Legislature's trustee 
obligations to regulate the use of waters. 
The Legislature adopted the Act in accordance with its responsibility to 
allocate the water for the use and welfare of all people and competing uses. In re 
Uintah Basin, 2006 UT 19, ~ 34, J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. The Legislature in the 
Act determined that regulations governing the recreational use ofpublic waters 
should vary when those waters flow over privately owned land as opposed to 
publicly owned land because such land-ownership differences implicate different 
competing-use concerns. The Legislature has greater control over actions and 
activities of public entities, as opposed to private property owners, and can impose 
greater burdens on public owners than on private owners to improve ecological 
conditions on the land over which the water flows-or to take other actions 
concerning use of or access to the waters. 
Various Utah statutory provisions point to broader purposes for the statutory 
provisions adopted or amended in the Act. Utah Code§ 73-29-103(6) indicates a 
purpose to accommodate the competing interests between recreational users of the 
waters and private pro petty owners over whose land the water runs. Section 79-
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29-203 also supports the Act's recognition that the public can establish through 
adverse use an individual right of public recreation on water flowing over private 
property. Section 73-1-1 recognizes public ownership of the waters in the State, 
but requires the Legislature to govern the use of public waters for beneficial 
purposes. "Beneficial use" is then established as the "basis, measure, and limit of 
all rights to the use ofwater." Utah Code § 73-1-3. In addition, the Utah Code 
requires the state engineer-the executive officer who licenses and approves 
appropriative uses of public waters- to consider whether an application to 
appropriate public waters would unreasonably affect public recreation on the 
natural stream environment, or would prove detrimental to public welfare. Utah 
Code § 73-3-8(1 )(b). Those provisions set forth express statutory purposes for 
regulating public waters in the State of Utah, including use of any public easement. 
These purposes are far broader than the limited purpose the trial court analyzed-
just providing access. 
This Court's precedent further demonstrates that in regulating uses of the 
State's waters, including use of the public easement, the Legislature is not limited 
solely to "promoting public access to and use of the waters." Rather, the 
Legislatw·e may take into account not just those persons attempting to access the 
waters for recreation, but all persons and all of their uses. In National Parks and 
Conservations Association, this Court stated that among the State's general trust 
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duties over public lands is the duty to "protect" the ecological integrity of public 
lands and their public recreational activities for the benefit of the public at large." 
Nat'/ Parks and Conservation Ass 'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,919 
(1993) (emphasis added). The Legislature has the "responsibility of allocating the 
use of the water for the benefit and welfare of all of the people." In re Uintah 
Basin, 2006 UT 19, , 34 (emphasis added). Thus "the Legislature, in the interest 
of public welfare, may prescribe reasonable conditions" on the use of the water. 
Tanner, 156 P. 2d at 963. 
Finally, the State proffered that the Act was adopted to increase and improve 
overall water resources, to provide incentives for stewardship over the waters, and 
to enhance the development of and access to the streams. R. 340. At the trial the 
State presented evidence of efforts to improve the streams and habitats on both 
public and private reaches of the streams. R. 3 722. Other evidence established 
efforts by public and private owners to improve the streams and recreational 
opportunities. Final Judgment at 26. 
Thus, the purpose of the Act was not merely to promote public access to and 
use of the waters in connection with the Conatser recreational easement. Rather it 
resulted from the Legislature's exercising its trust duties to regulate the use of and 
access to all the State's waters to benefit all the State's people. The Act embodies 
a classic legislative po1icy judgment about how to best balance all competing 
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interests in and claims to the State's waters-not just, as the district court reasoned, 
the interest in merely promoting recreational uses. 
With a proper understanding of the public easement and the Act's purposes, 
it becomes clear that the Act manages the easement consistent with the broad 
purposes for which it was acquired. The Act thus comports with at1icle XX, 
section 1, and is constitutional. 
C. The Act does not substantially impair the remaining waters, 
assuming that test even applies. 
Infusing article XX, section 1 with the common law public trust doctrine, the 
district court concluded that the Act was unconstitutional because its scope 
substantially impairs the lands and waters remaining. Final Judgment at 45-48. 
Even assuming this issue properly informs the relevant constitutional analysis, the 
district court erred for several reasons. 
1. The district court correctly held that the Act does not result 
in overcrowded publicly accessible waters. 
Notably, the district court correctly rejected the only concrete argument 
supporting impairment. USAC argued that by restricting access to 2, 700 miles of 
streams flowing over privately owned lands, the Act caused overcrowding on the 
remaining publicly accessible, fishable streams and substantially impaired the 
public's interest in them. Final Judgment at 48. The district court determined that 
USAC failed to prove the Act caused overcrowding. The court found that the 
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anecdotal evidence of crowding was evenly balanced and subjective; surveys of 
anglers showed that the "majority of anglers were mostly or completely satisfied 
with their fishing experience," even on the Lower and Middle Provo Rivers; and 
witnesses on both sides all agreed that any crowding had causes independent of the 
Act, including population growth, the growing popularity of fly-fishing and the 
increased number of guide services, and the State's promotion of Blue Ribbon 
Fisheries. See Final Judgment at 49. 
Further) regional managers of the Department of Natural Resources testified 
that all recreational experiences were available on the remaining publically 
accessible fishable streams and that there was no recreational activity that could be 
done before the Act that could not also be done after the Act on publically 
accessible waters. See, e.g.J R. 3720. Even USAC members who testified about 
their "preferred experiencen6 and fishing guides called by USAC said they could 
still obtain that great fishing experience on publicly-accessible waters after the Act 
but that it may take a little more time. R. 2990, 3071-72, 3256-57, 4229-31. And 
the fishing guides testified that even after the Act, Utah had publicly accessible 
world-class fishing. See, e.g., Final Judgment at 23. 
6 The anglers testified that their "preferred experience" was to be able to fly fish a 
stretch of a river without other anglers so that they could experience a "period of 
solitude" on the river. R. 2954, 2996-97. 
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USAC's failure to prove the Act caused overcrowding, combined with the 
fact that all recreational activities that could have been performed before the Act 
could still be and continued to be performed on the publicly accessible waters, 
forecloses any finding that the Act substantial impaired the remaining waters. The 
district court should have ended its substantial impairment analysis upon rejecting 
the over-crowding argument. 
2. The district court incorrectly held that the "scope" of the 
Act meant remaining waters were substantially impaired. 
Despite rejecting USAC's over-crowding argument, the court concluded that 
"the Act results in substantia] impairment by virtue of its scope." Final Judgment 
at 49. In the district court's view, the "Act eliminates all public recreational use on 
more than 2,700 miles of river and stream in Utah. This represents the closure of 
43o/o ofUtah's fishable rivers and stream miles to nearly all fishing, and to all 
hunting, wading, swimming, bird-watching, and any other recreational activity 
utilizing the water." Final Judgment at 53-54 as amended at R. 4854. The Act's 
scope was evidently more than the constitution could bear. Final Judgment at 58. 
The district court's analysis is legally and factually wrong. 
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(i). The mere scope of water affected by the Act does not 
determine whether unaffected remaining waters are 
substantially impaired 
As a matter of law and logic, the Act's scope--the percentage of water it 
affects-says next to nothing about the dispositive issue: whether the remaining-
unaffected-waters are substantially impaired. In other words, the substantial 
impairment analysis doesn't focus on what was lost; it focuses on what's left. The 
relevant cases put this point beyond debate, thereby highlighting the district coutt's 
error. 
This Court recognized Illinois Central R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 
(1892), as the "controlling case" regarding the public trust doctrine, Colman, 795 
P.2d at 635, which includes the substantial impairment element the district court 
grafted into article XX, section 1. Illinois Central stated that trust property can be 
'"alienated"' when, in relevant part, '"parcels can be disposed of without detriment 
to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining."' Colman, 795 P.2d at 635 
(quoting Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455-456). 
In Colman, this Court reiterated that if there is a disposition of public trust 
assets, the proper focus turns to the substantial impairment test: "a state can grant 
certain rights in navigable waters if those rights can be disposed of without 
affecting the public interest in what remains." 795 P.2d at 635-36. Given the 
preliminary posture of the Colman case, the Court couldn't apply the test. Instead 
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the Court remanded, noting that "[a]t this point in the litigation, there is nothing to 
show that Colman's canal [i.e., the lease/easement in part of the Great Salt Lake's 
bed] impaired the public interest in any way at the time the State granted him the 
right to conduct his operation." Jd. at 636. Again, the focus was on any 
impainnent to the remaining public interest, not on the scope of Colman's lease. 
As a matter of law, the district court's scope analysis misses the mark. The 
only relevant question is whether the Act substantially impaired the public 
easement in the public waters unaffected by the Act. It is undisputed that the 
remaining waters could still be used for the full range of recreational purposes, 
were and are being used for recreational purposes, and there has been no reduction 
in the ability to engage in those activities. Thus, the Act's alleged disposition of 
the Conatser easement did not "substantially impair" the use of the land and waters 
remaining because the public can still fully enjoy the easement. 
(ii). Even if scope were material, the district court used 
the wrong percentages based on an incorrect view of 
the relevant waters. 
Even if the district court's scope analysis were legally permissible, it's 
factually incorrect and overstates the Act's actual scope. As noted, the district 
court focused its attention on the limitations the Act placed on approximately 2,700 
of fishable streams flowing over private lands as a percentage of the approximately 
6,400 total miles of"fishable streams" on the State of Utah's Stream Access map. 
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Final Judgment at 11-13, 53-54. Thus, the court calculated, the Act affected 43% 
of all fishable streams in the state. /d. at 53-54. But neither the Act nor the 
public's easement (recreational or otherwise) is limited to fishable streams. 
The Act addresses the use of all ~'public waters," defined to include streams, 
rivers, and lakes and natural reservoirs (whether fishable or not).7 Similarly, the 
recreational easement defined in Conatser applies to ail "state waters" or public 
waters, not just cold-water fishable streams preferred by USAC. And the easement 
involves far more than just fishing. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ~ 14 (public's 
easement includes "the right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any 
lawful activity when utilizing that water." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Thus the district coutt's scope analysis fails on the facts in two ways. First, 
it fails to consider all of the public waters, including at least another 14,000 miles 
of rivers and streams, R. 2432; Final Judgment at 8, not to mention the vast amount 
of waters in the state's lakes and reservoirs. The district court had no evidence of 
the latter number, and thus could not have possibly assessed the Act's true scope. 
Second, the trial court failed to meaningfully consider the Act's scope on 
any recreational pursuits other than fly-fishing. The court couldn't accurately 
7 
"Public water'' is defined as "all waters in the State, whether above or 
underground," Utah Code § 73-1-1 (1 ), that are "flowing or collecting on the 
surface: (A) in a natural or realigned channel; or (B) in a natural lake, pond, 
reservoir on a natural or realigned channel," id. § 73-29-102 (8). 
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gauge the Act's scope without knowing (indeed without having any evidence of) 
how it affected the full range of the public easement in question. 
In short, the trial court's analysis clearly under-estimated the scope of the 
waters of the State of Utah and the recreational easement throughout the State, 
both as to the type of waters that it applies to as well as the type of recreation, e.g. 
hunting, swimming, wading, etc. 
(iii). The district court's scope analysis relies on unproven 
overcrowding assumptions. 
Having concluded that the Act did not cause overcrowding, Final Judgment 
at 54, the district court found itself in a predicament: how else to explain why its 
scope conclusions impaired the public easement. The court resorted to unproven 
overcrowding theories. 
For example, the Court cited a survey in which 70 percent of the anglers 
surveyed reported that they were likely to fish on waters that flowed over private 
ground and would now, because of the Act, have to fish on publically accessible 
streams. Final Judgment at 54. Similarly, the comi concluded that the Act 
increased the number of licensed anglers per river/stream mile. ld. at 55. And the 
court also determined that Utah streams were generally shorter and narrower and 
therefore had reduced canying capacity for recreation use. Jd. at 54-55. 
Moreover, the court worried that fly-fishing was growing in popularity at the same 
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time Utah's population is rising. Jd. at 55. To top it all off, the court expressed its 
policy concerns that the State promotes its Blue Ribbon Fisheries, "increasing the 
number of people who use these waters," while the Act restricted public access to 
areas that would otherwise qualify as Blue Ribbon Fisheries. !d. at 55. 
These "scope, arguments are simply re-packaged overcrowding theories and 
still do not prove that the Act substantially impaired the remaining lands and 
waters. Indeed, the district court already rejected the express arguments that 
overcrowding substantially impaired the public's use of the remaining lands and 
waters. Final Judgment at 49. Again, according to the district court, "the best 
evidence" showed that a vast majority of anglers "reported that crowding did not 
reduce or slightly reduced the quality of their fishing experience." Final Judgment 
at 49. And, as the court found, "all witnesses agreed that crowding-to the extent 
it does exist-had causes independent of the Act, including (1) Utah's growing 
population; (2) the State's public promotion of Blue Ribbon Fisheries; (3) the 
growing popularity of fly-fishing; and ( 4) the growing number of guide services in 
Utah." Final Judgment at 49. It is internally inconsistent, and wrong, for the 
district court to find that the same type of evidence that failed to prove the Act 
caused overcrowding can somehow still prove overcrowding under the guise of 
"scope." 
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Finally, the trial court indicated that "every parcel and public land, every 
reach of public water is unique" and that the Act impairs the public's interest in 
waters remaining because what remains is so "drastically diminished." Final 
Judgment at 58. Again, the trial court made this conclusion in the absence of any 
demonstrated negative effect. It apparently adopted the theory that since every 
stretch of public water is unique, anytime any pubic waters are restricted the 
remaining lands and waters will always be inadequate. But such a "not-one-foot-
loss-of-stream-access" is not and cannot be the law. First, it wrongly focuses on 
the restricted waters, rather than any impairment on the remaining waters. Second, 
it would invalidate many water laws and projects. Every time a dam is built, the 
recreational opportunities in the streambed that gets covered up by the dam water 
are destroyed as people can no longer fly-fish, walk or wade, hunt, or fish, in the 
streambed. Based upon the diversion of appropriated uses of waters, various 
stretches of the rivers and streams in Utah are diminished or have no water-flow 
and the recreational opportunities cease. In various streams, recreational activity is 
based upon stream-flow that is dependent upon appropriated uses- some uses 
allow recreational fishing activities to occur while other diversions end recreational 
activities. 
The district court's scope analysis simply repackages unproven 
overcrowding theories. Nothing about the Act's scope proves a substantial 
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impairment to the remaining waters. The district court's contrary conclusion 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Com1 should reverse the decision of the 
district court holding that provisions of the Public Waters Access Act violate 
article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, and judgment should be entered in 
favor of the State of Utah. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH




VR ACQUISITIONS, LLC, a Delaware limited 





This matter came before the Court for trial on August 26-28 and September 2-4, 2015. 
Plaintiff Utah Stream Access Coalition (“the Coalition”) was represented by its counsel, Craig C. 
Coburn and John L. Young.  Defendant VR Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA”) was represented by its 
counsel, Eric P. Lee, Nathan D. Thomas, and Elizabeth M. Butler.  Defendant State of Utah (“the 
State”) was represented by Assistant Attorney General Thomas D. Roberts.
On November 4, 2015, the Court issued a Ruling, Order and Final Judgment in favor of 
The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 21, 2015 /s/ DEREK P PULLAN
10:54:33 AM District Court Judge
December 21, 2015 10:54 AM 1 of 4
73/82
the Coalition.  On December 10, 2015, on motions filed by the Coalition and the State, the Court 
amended in part its Ruling, Order and Final Judgment and directed Coalition counsel to prepare 
this Judgment, for review and approval by counsel, consistent with the Court’s Ruling, Order and 
Final Judgment, as amended. 
JUDGMENT
The Public Waters Access Act violates article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
Specifically, the following provisions are unconstitutional:
• Utah Code § 73-1-1(2) and (3);
• Utah Code § 73-29-103(1) through (6);
• Utah Code § 73-29-201(2) and (3);
• Utah Code § 73-29-202(1) to the extent that the right to float recognized therein is 
limited to rivers and streams that have “sufficient width, depth, and flow to allow free 
passage of the chose vessel at the time of floating” such that touching the privately 
owned bed is prohibited;
• Utah Code § 73-290-202(3)(b);
Judgment is granted in favor of the Coalition, and against VRA and the State of Utah.
VRA is enjoined from taking any action which prohibits, prevents, impedes, limits, or 
impairs in any way the public’s right to access the stretch of the Upper Provo River flowing 
through VRA’s property.
The State of Utah, its agencies, and divisions are enjoined from enforcing those 
provisions of the Act held to be unconstitutional in the Court’s Ruling, Order and Final 
Judgment, as amended, and again here.
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The Department of Natural Resources and Division of Wildlife Resources shall either 
remove the Stream Access Map from the public website, or amend the Stream Access Map to be 
consistent with this Ruling.  Any and all other initiatives undertaken by the Department of 
Natural Resources or the Division of Wildlife Resources to notify the public of where the public 
can and cannot recreate on state waters shall be consistent with this Order and Judgment.
This is the final order and judgment of the Court.  No further action or order is necessary.
----------------END OF ORDER----------------
EXECUTED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT AS INDICATED
BY THE DATE AND SEAL AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH




Attorneys for VR Acquisitions, LLC
ATTORNEY GENERAL
   /s/   Thomas D. Roberts (w-permission)  
Thomas D. Roberts
Attorneys for State of Utah
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